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In many countries, pension systems are under reform (see OECD, 2011), because their sustainability
is under threat. In particular, a number of countries have set up funded pension arrangements to
complement or replace non-funded, pay-as-you-go arrangements, while other countries already
featuring a sizable funded pillar are reconsidering its design. Newly funded systems, such as those
in Israel and Norway, tend to be of the de￿ned-contribution (DC) type. In the case of the United
Kingdom de￿ned-bene￿t (DB) funded pensions have on a large scale been replaced by individual
funded DC arrangements,1 while in the Netherlands an increasing number of companies are putting
their pension funds at arm￿ s length in order to prevent pension risks from spilling over on to the
company￿ s balance sheet. This leads to the so-called funded collective de￿ned contribution (CDC)
arrangements. Many observers feel that this will be a ￿rst step towards a system of individual
funded DC arrangements.
Experience from the U.K. and the U.S. has shown that the size of the DC pension bene￿t
determined at retirement date is highly sensitive to the momentary levels of the interest rate
and the stock markets. This is also con￿rmed by Burtless (2000), who shows that the annuity
bene￿t of a male worker entering an individual retirement account plan at twenty-two, investing
his contributions in ￿nancial markets and retiring at sixty-two in 1975 would have been only two-
￿fths of what he would have received in 1969 when retiring at the same age. In addition, Agnew
(2003) shows that individuals fail to invest optimally in occupational DC accounts by investing all
or nothing in equity, trading infrequently and holding a disproportionate share of their pension
wealth in their own employer￿ s equity. Hence, pension fund participants run considerable risk in
terms of the future bene￿ts they may expect and this raises the question whether it is desirable to
retain or reintroduce at least some collective elements in funded DC pension arrangements.
In this paper, we explore and quantify the potential bene￿ts of incorporating such collective
features into a DC pension arrangement. In particular, we allow for the sharing of ￿nancial
market risks across the various generations participating in the fund. Financial market risks are
mainly concentrated with retirees and older workers, because these groups hold the largest stocks
of ￿nancial assets. However, precisely these groups have the shortest horizon to recover from
potential negative shocks, while they have limited or no ￿ exibility in terms of increasing their
labour supply. Therefore, it is relevant to examine the potential welfare gains from shifting some of
the ￿nancial markets risks from older individuals to younger individuals through the incorporation
of some risk-sharing mechanism into a DC pension arrangement. We consider a variety of risk-
sharing schedules. The "status-contingent" scheme sets the exposure of retirees to ￿nancial market
risk to zero and shifts this risk in a uniform way to the various working generations. That is, the
return that working generations receive on their asset holdings is blown up by a constant factor.
The "age-contingent" scheme di⁄ers from the status-contingent scheme in that the vulnerability to
￿nancial market risks is made to fall with the age of the worker, the idea being that older workers
have less time to restore from negative shocks and have less ￿ exibility to make up for losses by
increasing their labour supply. Moreover, older workers have larger ￿nancial asset holdings, which
increases their vulnerability to bad shocks. We also consider an "asset-contingent" risk-sharing
schedule, in which the increase in the sensitivity of individual compensation to ￿nancial market
risk is larger for workers at lower ages and belonging to higher skill (income) groups.
Our risk-sharing schemes are all intra-temporally balanced. That is, the ex-post transfers
that take place after the stochastic shocks have hit in a given period sum to zero. Moreover,
1See Workplace Retirement Income Commission (2011). The Commission has been installed out of dissatisfaction
with the large share of the working population not covered or insu¢ ciently covered by pension savings.
2our risk-sharing schemes do not involve ex-ante redistribution. However, they do lead to ex-post
redistribution of wealth across skill classes. Therefore, we introduce a second "asset-contingent"
scheme that avoids resource ￿ ows among skill groups. That is, after this risk-sharing scheme is
applied the aggregate ￿nancial wealth of each skill group is una⁄ected.
Our results are obtained through stochastic simulation of a many-generation overlapping gen-
erations model with a pension system, intragenerational heterogeneity, endogenous labour supply
and ￿nancial market and wage shocks. The pension system consists of a public pay-as-you-go ￿rst
pillar and a funded second pillar.
We ￿rst analyse the special case in which skill di⁄erences are absent. The aggregate welfare
e⁄ects as measured through equivalent variations are rather similar across the various risk-sharing
schemes at the level of the entire alive population, as well as at the level of the groups of workers
and retirees as a whole. Retirees as a group bene￿t under all schedules, while workers as a group
may be better or worse o⁄ depending on the speci￿c scheme in operation. However, the e⁄ects for
the workers as a group are quantitatively small and are dominated by the bene￿ts to the retired as a
group, implying that aggregate welfare at the level of the entire initially alive population is positive.
The almost negligible consequences for the group of workers are the result of two o⁄setting e⁄ects.
The group loses from increased exposure to ￿nancial market risk during their working life, but this
loss almost cancels against the bene￿t of reduced exposure when they are retired themselves.
The introduction of skill di⁄erences hardly a⁄ects the welfare consequences for the group of
workers as a whole or the group of retirees as a whole. However, looking at the consequences for
individual skill groups we see that the higher skilled is a retiree, the more he bene￿ts from the
introduction of a risk-sharing scheme. This is not surprising, because higher-skilled groups hold
more assets during retirement and, hence, bene￿t more from a stabilisation of the return on those
assets.
Finally, we explore the scope for making the risk-sharing scheme more attractive to workers by
increasing the tax deductability of pension contributions. Such increase comes at the cost of higher
consumption taxes, which are used to ￿nance the tax deductions. An increase in the tax deduction
of contributions can be bene￿cial for working cohorts, but comes at the cost of a reduction in
aggregate welfare due to e¢ ciency losses. Not surprisingly, retired generations always lose from
enhanced tax deductability of contributions.
There already exists a substantial literature on intergenerational risk sharing in pension systems.
For example, Wagener (2004) and Gottardi and Kubler (2011) study risk-sharing within PAYG
systems, while Matsen and Thogersen (2004) investigate the optimal division between PAYG and
funding from a risk-sharing perspective. Oher works studying intergenerational risk-sharing within
funded pension systems are Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009) and Cui et al. (2011). However, none
of the articles mentioned so far introduces our type of risk-sharing schemes into individual DC
schemes. Further, our framework incorporates features that are often absent in other articles. In
particular, we allow for intragenerational heterogeneity and endogenous labour supply.2
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 discusses the calibration. In Section 4 we present and discuss our results ￿rst for the case
without skill di⁄erences and then for the case with skill di⁄erences. Section ?? investigates whether
raising the tax deductability of pension contributions can better balance the bene￿ts of risk-sharing
between workers and retirees. Finally, Section 5 concludes the main body of the paper.
2Some papers do allow for endogenous labour supply, for example Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010), Mehkopf
(2010) and Beetsma et al. (2011)
32 The model
2.1 General framework
Time is discrete and a period corresponds to one year. All the variables are expressed in real terms.
We allow for three sources of shocks, namely to wage growth, stock returns and bond returns.
Each individual will be identi￿ed by two indices, i = 1;:::;I and j = 1;:::;J. The ￿rst index
denotes the skill group, where a higher value of i corresponds to a higher skill level. Individuals
born in a given skill group remain in the same skill group during their entire life. The second index
denotes age, which is measured as the number of years since entry into the labour force. Each
skill-age group consists of a continuum of individuals.
At the turn of each year the oldest generation dies and a new generation is born that is 1 + n
times larger than the cohort born one period earlier. In each period, there are J overlapping
generations. Under our assumption of a constant growth rate of the newborn cohort, the relative
sizes of the various age groups remain constant over time. Each cohort consists of a continuum of





where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the constant probability that a person will survive at the end of each period.
Individuals start each period within given levels of personal and retirement savings. Then,
workers choose their optimal consumption and labour supply. Retirees choose only their optimal
consumption level, while they earn an income from government provided social security and from
a private pension savings plan. Moreover, all individuals earn accidental bequests left by those
who die. Personal and retirement savings are subject to the same market return. However, they
di⁄er in two major ways. First, retirement savings are less liquid than personal savings, which are
immediately available for deposit and withdrawal at any moment. Retirement savings are instead
available for withdrawal only at retirement and for deposit only while working. Second, investing
in retirement savings is more rewarding, since contributions to the retirement pension scheme are
partly tax deductible and matched by the employer.
2.2 The income process and retirement bene￿ts
The pension system consists of two pillars. The ￿rst pillar, the social security system, is a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) arrangement. In each period the system receives contributions from workers and
pays bene￿ts to retirees. The second pillar is a funded DC arrangement.
Individuals work until the exogenous retirement age J +1 and live for at most J years. Income








wi;j;tli;j;t; j ￿ J;
where li;j;t 2 [0;1] is the amount of time spent working and wi;j;t is the wage rate per unit of labour
input, given by
wi;j;t = eisjzt;
where ei (i = 1;:::;I) is the e¢ ciency index for skill group i and sj (j = 1;:::;J) is a seniority




the contribution rates to social security and the private retirement pension plan (in the sequel
4referred to as "retirement plan"), respectively. Notice that all working individuals pay the same
(mandatory) contribution rates, while, moreover, only the contribution rate to social security is
time-dependent. Income depends on the exogenous process
zt = (1 + gt)zt￿1; (2)
where gt = g + ￿
g
t is the growth rate of the process, which is the sum of a constant deterministic
and a mean-zero stochastic component. We set z0 = 1.




In line with U.S. arrangements and those in many other countries, retirement plan contributions
are tax deductible up to a certain maximum ￿t = (1 + gt)￿t￿1 that grows at the same rate as the
wage rate. Hence, ￿t = zt
v0
z0. The tax deduction di;j;t is given by
di;j;t = ￿ min[xi;j;t;￿t]:
Further, the employer may match contributions to the retirement plan up to a certain maximum.
The amount of matching by the employer mi;j;t is given by
mi;j;t = ￿min[xi;j;t;￿t];
where ￿ is the match rate and ￿t is the match limit. Obviously, while the market return to personal
and retirement savings is the same, investing in the retirement plan is actually more rewarding
since contributions are tax deductible and matched by the employer.
Retirees (j > J) earn an income given by the bene￿ts from social security (bSS





i;j;t; j > J:
The social security bene￿t is a ￿xed fraction of the exogenous income process, identical for all
retirees,
bSS
t = ￿zt; 0 < ￿ < 1: (4)
Hence, the social security system is progressive, in that less-skilled individuals pay lower contri-
butions but receive the same bene￿ts as richer individuals. The contribution rate ￿
SS
t to the ￿rst

















Notice that zt can be eliminated from (5) and, hence, the contribution rate depends on time only
through the labour choice li;j;t.
In contrast to the social security bene￿t, the retirement plan bene￿t is a fraction of the accu-
















where rf is the risk-free annual real rate of return. That is, the bene￿t from the retirement plan
is computed in such a way that for given asset holdings ai;j;t the same constant level of bene￿ts
5bDC
i;j;t can be provided up to death, when taking account of mortality risk and assuming risk-free
market returns.3 However, from period to period this bene￿t level may ￿ uctuate with the level of
asset ai;j;t. Hence, the bene￿t bDC
i;j;t di⁄ers from an annuity which pays out the same amount each
period and individuals face uncertainty in retirement plan bene￿ts, though not in the contribution
rate to the plan.
Finally, the government ￿nances the tax deductions of the contributions to the retirement plan
through a value-added tax on consumption. Consumption is taxed at a rate ￿t. Hence, to enjoy
ci;j;t units of consumption, an individual pays (1 + ￿t)ci;j;t. We require the government￿ s budget
















The only role of accidental bequests in the model is to ensure that resources do not "disappear"
because people die. At the start of period t the government collects the personal assets of the











where si;j;t are the personal assets at the end of period t ￿ 1 of an individual from cohort j and
skill class i. The government redistributes St equally over all the alive individuals. Hence, each

















The fund redistributes At equally over all the alive individuals. Hence, each individual receives a








Elderly are heavily exposed to ￿nancial market shocks, because they hold a relatively large fraction
of assets and they have a relatively short remaining lifespan to recover from losses. In this section
we describe schemes intended to shift ￿nancial market risk from the elderly to younger cohorts.
3Because each skill-age group consists of a continuum of individuals, the fractions of the group that are alive in
future periods are known with certainty. Hence, individual longevity risks are shared and the pension fund that is
responsible for executing the retirement plans is always able to meet its obligations.
6Personal savings si;j;t evolve as
si;j;t =
(
(1 + rt)(si;j￿1;t￿1 + ht￿1 + yi;j￿1;t￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿)ci;j￿1;t￿1 + di;j￿1;t￿1) j ￿ J
(1 + rt)(si;j￿1;t￿1 + ht￿1 + yi;j￿1;t￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿)ci;j￿1;t￿1) j > J
; (8)




(1 + rt)(ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 + xi;j￿1;t￿1 + mi;j￿1;t￿1) j ￿ J
(1 + rt)
￿






i;j;t ( ai;j;t ) are pension asset holdings before (after) our risk-sharing scheme has been
applied, as will be explained shortly. Further, rt is the return on the individual￿ s personal and
pension investment portfolios. It is given by
rt = ￿rs
t + (1 ￿ ￿)rb
t;
where ￿ is the (exogenous and, by assumption, identical) share of both portfolios that is invested
in stocks. Here, rs
t and rb
t are the returns on stocks, respectively bonds, which are given by
rs
t = rs + ￿s
t;
rb
t = rb + ￿b
t;
where rs and rb are the corresponding averages and ￿s
t and ￿b
t are the corresponding mean-zero
shocks to the asset returns. Overall, an individual faces individual shocks to mortality as well
as aggregate shocks to wages and stock and bond returns. The aggregate shocks jointly follow a














The DC pension fund redistributes over the population shocks to returns in retirement savings,
















This expression says that the total amount of retirement savings after risk-sharing schedule has
been applied (the left-hand side) be equal to the total amount of retirement savings before the
risk-sharing schedule is applied (the right-hand side). Hence, the risk-sharing mechanisms that we
present below are budgetarily neutral. Retirement savings before risk sharing evolve as in equation
(9), while retirement savings after risk sharing are given by:
ai;j;t =
(
(1 + r)(ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 + xi;j￿1;t￿1 + mi;j￿1;t￿1) + ti;j;t; j ￿ J
(1 + r)
￿
ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 ￿ bDC
i;j￿1;t￿1
￿
+ ti;j;t; j > J
; (12)
where ti;j;t is the transfer resulting from the risk-sharing mechanism.
Risk sharing takes place as follows. Each individual will get her expected retirement savings,
which is the amount accumulated at the end of the previous year, ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 + xi;j￿1;t￿1 +
mi;j￿1;t￿1, grossed up by the expected market return r, rather than the actual market return rt,
plus a transfer ti;j;t. We de￿ne the transfer as a function of the di⁄erence between the actual
7and the expected net return on retirement savings, multiplied by the function f (i;j), which is a
function of the skill level and the age.
ti;j;t =
(
f (i;j)(rt ￿ r)(ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 + xi;j￿1;t￿1 + mi;j￿1;t￿1); j ￿ J
f (i;j)(rt ￿ r)
￿
ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 ￿ bDC
i;j￿1;t￿1
￿
; j > J
:
Hence, after the risk-sharing scheme has been applied an individual of working age will have
retirement savings equal to
ai;j;t =
(
(1 + r + (rt ￿ r)f (i;j))(ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 + xi;j￿1;t￿1 + mi;j￿1;t￿1); j ￿ J
(1 + r + (rt ￿ r)f (i;j))
￿
ai;j￿1;t￿1 + qt￿1 ￿ bDC
i;j￿1;t￿1
￿
; j > J
: (13)
The function f (i;j) governs the transfers after the shocks have materialised. It will be chosen so
as to protect the elderly (high j) and (in case) the less-skilled individuals (low i) relatively more
against unexpected shocks. The rationale for these choices is that (1) the elderly have relatively
little ￿ exibility to respond to shocks and, hence, they may bene￿t from less uncertainty about
the bene￿ts they receive, and (2) policymakers want to protect the less-skilled, and hence poorer,
individuals from too large ￿ uctuations in their income. As a result, for the elderly and less-skilled
individuals, f (i;j) will be smaller in absolute magnitude.
In qualitatitve terms we would expect this to be the outcome under a utilitarian planner who
decides about the allocation of resources over the population. Since the total amount of retirement
savings must be una⁄ected by the ex-post transfers, some groups (the younger and more-skilled
individuals) will actually face retirement savings that are more volatile than in the absence of the
risk-sharing scheme. Notice that the risk-sharing mechanism amounts to pure risk sharing. There





for all i;j and t.
We consider ￿ve di⁄erent schedules for the rescaling function f (i;j).
a. Uniform risk-sharing scheme (benchmark)
This schedule serves as the benchmark. Under this schedule,
f (i;j) = 1; 8i;j;
and, hence, ab
i;j;t = ai;j;t for all i and j. Hence, there is no risk-sharing amoung individuals.4 We
refer to this case as the pure DC scheme.
b. Status-contingent risk-sharing scheme
Retirees face no ￿nancial market uncertainty and always receive the expected return on their




￿1; j ￿ J
0; j > J
:
The idea behind this scheme is that, unlike retirees, workers can react to shocks in their asset
returns by changing their labour input, while, moreover, they have a relatively large amount of
time left to recover from adverse shocks in their asset returns.
c. Age-contingent risk-sharing scheme
4Longevity risks are always shared (Footnote 3). Hence, when referring to "no risk sharing ", we refer to the
sharing of the other, aggregate risks.
8Under this scheme the uncertainty about the returns to retirement savings falls linearly with





1 + J ￿ j
￿
; j ￿ J
0; j > J
:
This scheme is a re￿nement of the previous one and its motivation is analogous. Younger workers
have more room to vary their labour input and to restore from adverse developments in the ￿nancial
markets.
d. Asset-contingent risk-sharing scheme-I
Uncertainty is zero for retirees and for individuals with the largest amount of retirement savings
in their skill group (i.e., those exactly at retirement age J). It is instead di⁄erent from zero for
all the other workers. In particular, it is larger for workers at lower ages and belonging to higher
skill groups. Function f (i;j) then decreases with age progressively more quickly for more highly-
skilled groups. Hence, for a given working age j, function f (i;j) takes on larger values for more
highly-skilled groups, the idea being that higher-income individuals can manage more risk in their
asset income. To compute the rescaling function we take for retirement savings the levels based on
a history of average market returns, which we denote by ai;j;0:5
f (i;j) =
(
￿3 (maxj fai;j;0g ￿ ai;j;0); j ￿ J
0; j > J
:
e. Asset-contingent risk sharing scheme-II
Asset-contingent scheme-I gives rise to a rescaling function that di⁄ers by age and skill group.
It leads to ex-post redistribution along two dimensions, age and skill. Asset-contingent scheme-II
closely resembles asset-contingent scheme-I, except that it is speci￿cally designed to avoid ex-post
redistribution across skill groups. In the case when all individuals have identical skills asset-




￿4i (maxj fai;j;0g ￿ ai;j;0); j ￿ J
0; j > J
;
where the parameter ￿4i is skill-speci￿c.
The parameters ￿1;￿2;￿3 are larger than zero and chosen such that equation (11) is satis￿ed.
The parameters ￿4i;i = 1;:::;I, are also larger than zero, but each one of them is chosen to satisfy








implying that there are no net ex-post transfers across skill groups, but that all the ex-post redis-
tribution takes place within the same skill group. Choosing all the I parameters this way implies
that equation (11) is respected.
5We take the time t = 0 distribution of retirement savings to avoid the circularity problem of having retirement
savings that depend on the rescaling function that in turn depends on retirement savings. The t = 0 distribution is
generated through a preliminary run of the model before the actual simulation starts on which our calculations are
based. More details are given below.
92.5 The individual decision problem
The individual￿ s value function is:
Vi;j;t (si;j;t;ai;j;t) = max
ci;j;t;li;j;t
fu(ci;j;t;li;j;t) + ￿￿Et [Vi;j+1;t+1 (si;j+1;t+1;ai;j+1;t+1)]g; (15)












Equation (15) is subject to the dynamics of (8) and (13). Maximization of the value function (15)
yields the following set of ￿rst-order conditions:
8
> > > > > > <











































where 1fxi;j;t<￿tg is a dummy variable equal to 1 if xi;j;t < ￿t and 0, otherwise. The second
￿rst-order condition is only relevant for j ￿ J, because retirees only optimise over consumption.
2.6 Welfare comparisons between policies
We de￿ne the equivalent variation EV
A;B
i;j;1 for skill group i of cohort j alive at t = 1 as the one-time
transfer of resources that this particular group should receive extra in scenario A to obtain the
















are the arguments of the value function, that is the sum si;j;1+EV
A;B
i;j;1
of the initial level of personal assets and the equivalent variation and the initial level of retirement
assets ai;j;1. As an example, suppose that EV
A;B
i;j;1 = 0:050. If the initial wage rate is unity, this
implies an equivalent variation of 5% of the initial wage rate. Newly-born individuals start with
zero pension and private savings, hence ai;1;t = si;1;t = 0.

























where 1f:g is an indicator equal to 1, if the condition within the curly brackets holds, and 0,
otherwise. We report also these aggregate measures for the groups of alive workers and retirees
separately.
10To understand the extent to which di⁄erent skill levels a⁄ect our conclusions, we ￿rst present
results for the case in which skill di⁄erences are absent. In so doing, we construct the relevant










￿;j;1 is the equivalent variation for cohort j at time t = 1, belonging to the only skill











￿;j;1) is the value function under scenario B for cohort j at time t = 1.
We focus the analysis on generations that are born at t = 1 or earlier. We do not consider
future-born generations as this would provide no further insights. In fact, in this setting, shocks
are i.i.d. and there is no memory of the past. Hence, the ex-ante situation of an agent who is born
at t = 1 and experiences a risk-sharing scheme for all his life coincides with that of an agent born
later, because both agents face identical conditions at birth.
3 Calibration and simulation set-up
3.1 Calibration
The model includes exogenous and endogenous parameters. The social security contribution rate
￿
SS
t , the consumption tax rate ￿ and the parameters ￿1;￿2;￿3 and ￿4i of the various rescaling
functions are endogenous. The social security contribution rate is derived from equation (5). At
the start of each simulation run it equals 13:209%. The parameters ￿1;￿2; and ￿3 are determined
from equation (11) and are equal to 1:92; 0:16; and 0:44, respectively. In contrast, the parameters
￿4i are derived from equation (14) and they range from 3:48 (skill group 1) to 0:25 (skill group
10). These parameters induce the rescaling functions shown in Figure 1 below. Rescaling di⁄ers
by skill group only under the two asset-contingent risk-sharing schemes.
































































a. All b. Asset-contingent-I, di⁄erent skills
Figure 1. Rescaling functions
11Table 1 lists the exogenous parameters of the model and their calibration under the benchmark
analysis. The parameters are chosen such that they reproduce main features of the U.S. economy.
The economically active life of an individual starts at real-life age 25, which in the model we reset
to j = 1. He then works for J = 37 years, which corresponds to a real-life age of 62. At that
moment retirement starts. This retirement age is in line with median ￿gures in Munnell et al.
(2008) and calibrations in Laibson et al. (2007) and Bucciol (2011). Individuals live for at most
J = 75 years after entry into the labour force, which corresponds to real-life age 100. We calibrate
the conditional annual survival probability ￿ such that life expectancy is 53 more years at the
moment of entry into the labour force. Hence, life expectancy is set at age 78, which is consistent
with current ￿gures from various sources (for instance, the Social Security Administration, see Bell
and Miller, 2005). Using (1), the constant population growth rate n is determined to produce a
dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees over working-age individuals) of 33%.
Preference parameters
We set the discount factor at ￿ = 0:96, a rather common choice in the macroeconomic literature
(e.g., see Imrohoroglu, 1989, or Krebs, 2007), and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at ￿ = 3,
which accords quite well with the assumed risk aversion in much of the macroeconomic literature
(see, e.g., Imrohoroglu et al., 2003) as well as estimates at the individual level (for example, Gertner,
1993, and Beetsma and Schotman, 2001). The parameter ￿, which determines the substitution
between consumption and leisure, is chosen to produce an average leisure choice of l = 0:5 (half of
the time is devoted to work and half to leisure).6
Income
The e¢ ciency index feig
I
i=1 is based on the income deciles for the U.S. for the year 2000
reported by the World Income Inequality Database (WIID, version 2.0c, May 2008). We normalise
the index such that it has an average value of unity. The seniority index fsjg
I
j=1 uses the average
of Hansen￿ s (1993) estimation of median wage rates by age group. We take the averages between
males and females and interpolate the data using the spline method.
Portfolio investment and ￿nancial markets
We assume that ￿ = 0:5, implying that always half of the personal and pension portfolios consist
of equity. The average risk-free rate is set to rf = 1:533%, which is the historical yield of three-
month U.S. Treasury bills over the sample period 1986-2005, covered at monthly frequency. This
yield is corrected for in￿ ation, measured as the growth rate in the CPI for all urban consumers.
Shocks
The averages, variances and covariances of wage growth, stock returns and bond returns are
estimated at monthly frequency from U.S. historical data covering the period 1986-2005. This
period is selected to end well before the start of the recent ￿nancial and economic crisis in which
economies have behaved in an unusual way. Speci￿cally, we take series on personal income net of
government transfers, rents and revenues from ￿nancial assets (source: U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis), the MSCI U.S. stock index (source: Datastream) and the Merrill Lynch U.S. corporate
and government master index (source: Datastream). Wage growth and returns are then converted
into real terms by subtracting the CPI index for all urban consumers.
We estimate the average real wage growth rate, stock return and bond return at, respectively,
g = 2:665%, rs = 7:934%, and rb = 5:567%. The standard deviations associated with the corre-
6We assume that a full day is 16 hours. Hence, we exclude 8 hours of sleep, while l = 0:5 corresponds to the
conventional working day of 8 hours.
12sponding shocks are, respectively, 1:964%, 15:584%, and 5:961%.7 The three variables show little
correlation, comprised between 3:29% for the correlation between wage growth and the stock return
and 8:51% for the correlation between the stock and bond returns. With these ￿gures we ￿ll the
variance-covariance matrix of the shocks ￿.
Social security and retirement assets
Social security in the U.S. provides a replacement rate, i.e. the ratio between the ￿rst pension
bene￿t and the ￿nal salary payment of around 40%. We set the parameter ￿ = 0:2, obtained
as 0:4 times the average labour choice of 0:5 over working life. We set the contribution rate to
the retirement plan at ￿
DC = 0:10, implying that the bene￿t from the retirement plan is roughly
equal to that from social security. We then set the three parameters describing the features of
the retirement plan to match the features of a typical 401(k) plan. Following the calibration in
Love (2006), we assume a match rate by the employer of ￿ = 0:5 and an initial match limit
￿0 = 0:06.8 That is, the employer matches 50 cents for each dollar contributed by the employee,
with the match capped at the level that corresponds to employee contributions equal to 6% of
compensation. We also assume a deduction rate of ￿ = 0:2, in line with the e⁄ective federal
tax rate (see Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2007). These assumptions give rise to an e⁄ective
return on retirement assets above the return on personal assets, as frequently documented in the
literature (see Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996, and P￿stor and Stambaugh, 2003). Finally, the
consumption tax rate is obtained from equation (7) and is ￿ = 0:012 in the benchmark case.9
Table 1. Benchmark calibration
Symbol Description Calibration
J Length of working life 37
J Maximum death age after entry into labour force 75
￿ Annual survival probability 0:991
n Population growth rate 1:797%
￿ Discount factor 0:96
￿ Relative risk-aversion parameter 3
￿ Consumption-leisure parameter 0:25
feig
I
i=1 E¢ ciency index (10 groups) WIID (2008)
fsjg
I
j=1 Seniority index Hansen (1993)
￿ Portfolio share in stocks 0:5
rf Risk-free real return 1:533%
g Average real wage growth rate 2:665%
rs Average real stock return 7:934%
rb Average real bond return 5:567%
￿ Bene￿t scale factor 0:2
￿
DC Retirement asset contribution rate 0:10
￿0 Match limit 0:06
￿ Match rate 0:5
￿ Tax deduction parameter 0:2
7Standard deviations are calculated on returns in excess of the return to the risk free asset, to remove the part
of volatility related to the asset that we consider risk free.
8With our calibration contributions to the retirement pension scheme are on average equal to xi;j;t =
￿DCeisjztli;j;t = 0:05, thus very close to ￿0 = 0:06. This means that the employer usually matches most con-
tributions.
9Below, we will explore how our results are a⁄ected if we vary the tax deductability parameter ￿ of pension
contributions.
133.2 Simulation set-up
We run 1;000 simulations of the model for Y = 2J ￿ 1 = 149 years in total. The simulations are
based on random draws of the nominal wage growth rate and market returns from the shock process
(10). The initial J ￿ 1 years of the simulation are treated as "shadow" years. These observations
are not used in the calculation of the statistics. During the shadow years there is no uncertainty.
This part of the simulation merely serves to produce a set of initial asset holdings for the cohorts
of di⁄erent ages. We use the remaining simulation years, when individuals do face shocks in the
returns to their private and pension asset portfolios and, hence, engage in risk sharing, for the
calculation of our statistics. We reset time, so that the ￿rst period of this part of the simulation
becomes t = 1. In this year a contingent risk-sharing scheme may be started. We assume that all
individuals in t = 1 start with the levels of personal and retirement assets that are obtained in the
latest "shadow" year of the simulation.
4 The results
4.1 All individuals have identical skills
Table 2 reports the aggregate welfare e⁄ects of a switch from no risk sharing to risk sharing. We
omit the case of asset-contingent-II indexation scheme, as it coincides with an asset-contingent-
I indexation scheme in the absence of skill di⁄erentiation. We report both the percentages of
individuals in favour of the shift as well as aggregate equivalent variations. We do this for current
workers, current retirees and all currently alive. While a vast majority of the currently retired are
in favour of some form of risk sharing, the shares of workers in favour vary substantially across the
various schemes. In terms of equivalent variation, the retired as a group gain substantially from
risk sharing. This is not surprising, because they shed a substantial amount of risk by limiting the
consequences of ￿ uctuations in asset returns for the returns on their portfolio of pension savings.
This bene￿t is strengthened by the fact that the elderly have on average little time left to recover
from bad shocks. Current workers lose under the status-contingent scheme and gain under the
other schemes. However, the welfare e⁄ects for this group as a whole are substantially smaller than
for the retired.
Table 2. Aggregate welfare e⁄ects - no skill di⁄erences
Cohorts workers retired all
% in favour of contingent risk sharing
Status-contingent 4.497 98.343 27.782
Age-contingent 43.465 98.343 57.081
Asset-contingent-I 60.429 98.343 69.836
Equivalent variation
Status-contingent -0.044 1.822 1.296
Age-contingent 0.112 1.822 1.340
Asset-contingent-I 0.139 1.822 1.348
The reason for the much-smaller welfare e⁄ect for this group is that the loss they experience
from larger ￿ uctuations in the value of their pension asset portfolio during their working life,
which result in a higher variance of asset holdings on retirement date under the alternatives to the
pure DC scheme (see Table 3), is compensated by smaller (zero) ￿ uctuations in the value of their
14pension asset portfolio once they are retired. The welfare consequences are suppressed further by
the intertemporal consumption and leisure smoothing, which reduces the welfare consequences of
any shock. This is, in particular, the case for the very youngest, who have the longest period over
which to smooth the e⁄ects of shocks on consumption and labour supply. Also, the very youngest
have relatively little assets and, hence, the impact of shocks on consumption is small.













Figure 2. Welfare comparison (all schemes) - no skill di⁄erences
Table 3. Assets at retirement date: summary statistics - no skill di⁄erences
Indexation median mean std. dev. coe⁄. of variation
Uniform 11.536 12.136 4.285 0.353
Status-contingent 9.384 11.194 7.849 0.701
Age-contingent 8.535 12.049 10.658 0.885
Asset-contingent I 9.479 12.234 7.483 0.612
4.2 Di⁄erences in skills
Now we assume the presence of ten di⁄erent and equally-sized skill groups and repeat the analysis
of the previous subsection. Table 4 aggregates the welfare e⁄ects over all skill groups for workers
as a group and retirees as a group. Comparing the ￿gures in Table 4 with those in Table 2, we see
that at the aggregate level the introduction of skill di⁄erences has hardly any impact.
15Table 4. Aggregate welfare e⁄ects - skill di⁄erences
Cohorts workers retired all
% in favour of risk sharing
Status-contingent 5.689 97.321 28.425
Age-contingent 45.533 97.321 58.383
Asset-contingent-I 68.080 97.321 75.336
Asset-contingent-II 19.648 97.491 38.963
Equivalent variation
Status-contingent -0.087 1.773 1.249
Age-contingent 0.115 1.773 1.306
Asset-contingent-I 0.008 1.773 1.276
Asset-contingent-II 0.106 1.773 1.303
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Figure 3. Welfare comparison
All retirees are in favour of the switch to a risk-sharing scheme. However, the size of the bene￿t
di⁄ers substantially across the skill groups ￿see Figure 3. The higher the skill group of a retiree,
the more she or he bene￿ts from the switch. This is not surprising, because higher-skilled groups
hold more assets during retirement and, hence, bene￿t more from a stabilisation of the return on
those assets.
Table 5 shows the e⁄ects of the switch to workers for a selected set of individual skill groups.
For status-contingent transfers large majorities of workers in all skill groups are opposed to the
16switch. In contrast, for the asset-contingent-I scheme it is only the highest skill groups that are in
majority against the switch, because they absorb a large share of the volatility in the asset returns
from the other groups. Asset-contingent-II scheme is on average unpopular to workers from all
skill groups as it protects the workers with the highest asset levels, i.e. those close to retirement,
from ￿nancial market volatility at the cost of younger workers.
Comparing workers of di⁄erent ages, we ￿nd that older workers tend to be in favour of risk
sharing. Speci￿cally, when we consider cohorts (having aggregated over the skill groups) we see
that under status-contingent indexation the oldest seven cohorts of workers are in favour of a
switch to risk sharing. Under the other scenarios, many more workers prefer the switch: the
oldest ￿fteen cohorts under age-contingent indexation and the oldest twenty-three cohorts under
asset-contingent-I indexation prefer the switch.
Table 5. Aggregate welfare e⁄ects for workers by skill group
Skill group 1 3 5 6 8 10
% in favour of risk sharing
Status-contingent 16.414 4.497 4.497 4.497 4.497 4.497
Age-contingent 55.474 52.980 48.379 44.985 43.465 22.442
Asset-contingent-I 100 100 100 91.896 24.521 12.859
Asset-contingent-II 14.673 20.420 20.420 20.420 20.420 20.420
Equivalent variation
Status-contingent 0.001 0.000 -0.014 -0.027 -0.085 -0.528
Age-contingent 0.002 0.026 0.064 0.087 0.158 0.411
Asset-contingent-I 0.002 0.032 0.081 0.110 0.173 -0.699
Asset-contingent-II 0.002 0.025 0.062 0.084 0.150 0.357
Table 6 reports for an agent born at t = 1 under asset-contingent scheme-I the standard
deviations of the gross asset returns after risk-sharing has taken place, i.e. (1 + r + (rt ￿ r)f (i;j)),
at ages 1 and J￿1. It also reports the average of those standard deviations across all ages. Clearly,
the gross asset returns are most volatile for the youngest workers and least volatile for the oldest
workers. In addition, for given age they are more volatile for higher-skilled workers than for lower-
skilled workers. The ￿rst six skill groups face lower uncertainty over their asset returns than under
the benchmark of pure DC where the life-cycle standard deviation is 8.318%, while the other skill
groups face higher uncertainty. Also from this table it is clear that the high-skilled groups absorb
a large part of the burden of the switch to this risk-sharing scheme. This e⁄ect is strengthened by
the facts that it is these groups that hold the largest amounts of wealth at retirement and that the
wealth distribution is highly skewed with average wealth at retirement date of skill group 10 being
more than twice average wealth at retirement of skill group 8.
17Table 6. Standard deviation
of asset returns after risk sharing,
asset-contingent-I scheme
Average Age 1 Age J ￿ 1
Average 9.145 27.389 1.916
skill 1 1.719 5.148 0.360
skill 3 4.550 13.620 0.952
skill 5 6.952 20.814 1.455
skill 6 8.235 24.652 1.724
skill 8 11.825 35.399 2.475
skill 10 24.035 72.066 5.043
4.3 Varying the tax deductibility of pension contributions
The preceding analysis showed that the gains from introducing a risk-sharing schedule are highly
unevenly distributed with the elderly as a group enjoying a substantial welfare gain and the young
as a group enjoying only a small welfare gain or even losing from the arrangement. The question
is whether the welfare gains of such an arrangement can be better distributed across the two
groups. In this regard, the obvious policy option would be to increase the tax deductability of
the second pillar contributions. For the case in which skill di⁄erences are absent, Table 7 shows
that variations in tax deductability do have some e⁄ect although this e⁄ect is quantitatively rather
small.10 The table also reports the implied average tax rate over time.11 On the one hand, due
to e¢ ciency losses caused by an increased distortion in the consumption-leisure trade-o⁄ there is
always a negative e⁄ect of a rise in tax deductibility on aggregate welfare. On the other hand, for
the working cohorts there is an o⁄setting positive e⁄ect arising from the bene￿t of increased tax
deductability of their pension contributions that is partly paid for by the retired generations. In
the case of the age-contingent and the asset-contingent-I scheme working generations bene￿t on
net, while in the case of status-contingent risk-sharing the negative e¢ ciency e⁄ect prevails. The
group of retirees always loses from an increase in the deductability of pension contributions.
10The percentages in favour of the switch to contingent risk sharing remain the same as in Table 2 for all values
of ￿ that we consider, hence these percentages are not reported again.
11The tax rate hardly varies over time.
18Table 7. Equivalent variation with changing tax deductability
Consumption tax Workers Retired All
￿ =0 (￿ = 0)
Status-contingent -0.041 1.846 1.314
Age-contingent 0.110 1.846 1.357
Asset-contingent-I 0.126 1.846 1.364
￿ =0:1 (￿ = 0:006)
Status-contingent -0.043 1.836 1.306
Age-contingent 0.111 1.836 1.350
Asset-contingent-I 0.137 1.836 1.357
￿ =0:3 (￿ = 0:018)
Status-contingent -0.046 1.816 1.291
Age-contingent 0.112 1.816 1.336
Asset-contingent-I 0.140 1.816 1.344
￿ =0:4 (￿ = 0:024)
Status-contingent -0.048 1.806 1.283
Age-contingent 0.113 1.806 1.329
Asset-contingent-I 0.142 1.806 1.337
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the introduction of collective risk-sharing elements in individual
DC pension arrangements. The motivation for this research is that participants of individual DC
arrangements run substantial risk during retirement because cannot share their risks with other
groups. We measure the consequences of the introduction of risk-sharing arangements in terms of
equivalent variations and ￿nd that the various schedules we consider work out in rather similar
ways at the level of the current population and at the level of the groups of workers and retirees.
Retirees as a group bene￿t under all schedules from the reduction in their exposure to ￿nancial
market risk, while workers as a group may be better or worse o⁄ depending on the speci￿c scheme
in operation. However, the e⁄ects for the group of workers as a whole are quantitatively small,
implying that the aggregate welfare e⁄ects for the initially-alive generations are always positive.
On the one hand workers su⁄er from increased exposure during their working life, while on
the other hand they bene￿t from reduced exposure once they are retired. An increase in the tax
deductability of their pension contributions is bene￿cial for workers under some schemes, although
quantitatively the e⁄ect is small, but it needs to be traded o⁄ against e¢ ciency losses that always
reduce aggregate welfare as measured by our equivalent variations.
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